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This article uses case study data from a major Irish city council to investigate and
explain public sector worker attitudes towards social partnership at local and national
level. It is argued that the more sceptical attitudes to workplace partnership reflect
structural differences between local and national arrangements, which have enabled
public sector employers to use ‘social partnership’ as a constraint in the implementa-
tion process of a pre-determined public sector reform agenda.
1 INTRODUCTION
The period since 1987 has seen the conclusion of a succession of national social pacts
between the Irish social partners. Since the mid-1990s the diffusion of partnership to
workplace level has become an important objective of the agreements. While much
has been written on the macro-effects of national partnership (Hastings et al., 2007;
Mac Sharry and White, 2001), empirical studies of the actual effects of existing
workplace partnership structures have been slower to emerge (cf. D’Art and Turner,
2002; Geary, 2008; Geary and Roche, 2006). Even rarer are accounts of the partner-
ship process that explicitly incorporate both national and workplace levels. This may
be understandable in the private sector context, where national deals place few
obligations on employers beyond pay, but, as we will see, seems less explicable in
relation to the public sector. In addition, the literature has primarily been concerned
with the impact of partnership processes on the industrial relations (IR) actors, rather
than on employees themselves.
This article uses case study data to investigate and explain differing public sector
worker attitudes towards social partnership at local and national levels. The role of
the public sector is crucial to any analysis of Irish social partnership. First, given that
trade union density in the public sector is much higher than in the private sector, the
public sector unions (in particular the state’s second-largest union, the Irish Munici-
pal Public and Civil Trade Union—IMPACT) have always had a key role in shaping
and sustaining the process (Baccaro and Simoni, 2007). At workplace level, it is
important to note that, although the development of workplace partnership struc-
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tures has been promoted in the national deals since the mid-1990s, initiatives have
been voluntarist in nature, and the result has been a low incidence of workplace
partnership structures in the private sector; these are much more common in the
public sector (Geary, 2006; O’Connell et al., 2004).1 Finally, a key focus of our
analysis is the interlinking of the partnership and public sector modernisation
agendas which, we will argue, is vital to explaining worker attitudes to public sector
partnership.
Our data suggests that, while national agreements are perceived quite positively,
public sector workers’ attitudes towards local partnership arrangements are much
more sceptical. Likewise, local partnership arrangements seem to be much more
unstable than national pacts (O’Connell et al., 2004). It has been suggested that the
difficulties of local partnership are linked to the more militant attitudes of workers,
middle-management and worker representatives. Our analysis of partnership struc-
tures and examination of worker attitudes however proffers a different explanation
focusing on how workplace partnership in the public sector has been used as a means
of facilitating the implementation of a pre-determined management reform agenda.
2 CAN’T WE ALL JUST GET ALONG? PARTNERSHIP AND PUBLIC
SECTOR REFORM
The Irish social partnership process has attracted significant attention in the IR
literature, with a significant portion of this focused on ‘accounting’ for the Irish case
(Auer, 2000; Baccaro, 2003; Roche, 2007), as Ireland, with its Anglo-Saxon IR
tradition, was seen as not possessing the classical ‘institutional preconditions’
(Baccaro, 2002) for corporatist deals. Thus, the Irish process has been variously
categorised as an example of: ‘deliberative governance’ (O’Donnell, 2000); ‘competi-
tive corporatism’ (Roche, 2007); an ‘unorthodox system of institutional complemen-
tarities’ (Teague and Donaghey, 2009); and from a critical perspective, union
incorporation (Allen, 2000) and the emasculation of Parliamentary democracy
(O’Cinnéide, 1998). The intention here is not necessarily to weigh in on this debate,
but to flag a possible alternative way of viewing the partnership process as it applies
to the public sector, focusing on the (to date somewhat neglected) relationship
between partnership and public sector reform.
For both critics and proponents of the partnership process, with its high-level
political exchange among union elites, employers and government, and the tendency
under bargained corporatism for power to shift towards the union centre, a funda-
mental concern relates to the exclusion of participation by workers and union
members at the level of the workplace. Ireland (unlike many European countries) does
not provide for workplace participation in the form of statutory works councils. As
the national process developed, therefore, attempts intensified to develop partnership
at workplace level and thus link up the enhanced role for trade unions at national level
with increased influence for workplace worker representatives. The Partnership 2000
and Programme for Prosperity and Fairness (PPF) agreements defined ‘enterprise
partnership’ as an active relationship between stakeholders based on a recognition of
their common interest in the prosperity of the enterprise, which involves common
ownership of the resolution of challenges. Nine areas were identified in which the
1 Note, too, recent evidence that the overwhelming majority of workplace partnership agreements in the
UK, albeit in a very different institutional setting, are in the public sector (Bacon and Samuel, 2009).
462 Michael Doherty and Roland Erne
© 2010 The Author(s)
Industrial Relations Journal © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
concept would be particularly apposite (e.g. work organisation, financial involve-
ment; see paragraph 9.12 of Partnership 2000).
Unlike the statutory works council model, the national agreements have used a
voluntary framework approach (Geary and Roche, 2005) to encourage and promote
the ‘bottom-up’ development of partnership at local level and allow partnership to be
tailored to local needs and preferences. The discourse of workplace partnership,
therefore, is framed in terms of solidarity, inclusiveness, participation and workplace
democracy. This is particularly true of the focus of this article, local government. For
example, the Deepening Partnership in Local Government Strategic Plan 2003–05
states that:
the vision for partnership in local authorities is for it to become the established way of doing business,
which would involve management, unions and staff at all levels in addressing a wide range of issues of
strategic and operational importance and in delivering positive outcomes to all stakeholders . . .
(paragraph 4.1).
Irish social partnership thus created a two-tier industrial relations framework that
operates at national and workplace levels. However, whereas corporatist arrange-
ments traditionally established a national framework of entitlements and obligations
to guide how employers and employees should behave at work, social partnership in
the Irish case did not display such interlocking connections between the two levels.
Apart from the centrally agreed obligation to pay moderate wage increases, Irish
social pacts placed few constraints on private sector firms, granting them almost
‘complete autonomy to pursue corporate strategies of their choosing at the company
level’ (Teague and Donaghey, 2009; 67). Accordingly, whenever scholars referred to
partnership arrangements at workplace level, they referred to Anglo-Saxon volunta-
rist frameworks rather than the corporatist and statutory settings that govern work-
place relations in continental Europe (Geary, 2008; Roche, 2007).
The situation in the public sector, however, has been somewhat more complicated.
While the national framework agreements were not binding, they undoubtedly had
more ‘teeth’ as they explicitly required the parties to fuse the management of public
service reform with the establishment of workplace partnership arrangements (Geary,
2008; 563). The aspiration to shift to a partnership approach in the public sector
comes at a time when public administration (particularly, but not exclusively, in the
Anglo-Saxon context) continues to be subject to what Du Gay (2008: 336) refers to as
‘extraordinary degrees of turbulence’. There has been mounting pressure for the
public sector to be more ‘efficient’ and ‘cost-effective’, which has often resulted in
heightened managerialism and the blurring of boundaries between the experience of
public and private businesses (Pate et al., 2007).
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), Ireland has ‘significantly advanced along a New Public Management (NPM)
continuum’ (OECD, 2008: 18) of public sector reform first outlined in the Strategic
Management Initiative (SMI) of 1994 and expanded through Delivering Better Gov-
ernment in 1996 (a specific framework for reform of local authority structures, Better
Local Government, was also published in 1996). The SMI explicitly brought the social
partners on board to input into the reform process (OECD, 2008). In Ireland, as in
most European countries, public sector reform efforts have been centred around the
need to revamp performance appraisal systems and create more effective tools for
‘performance management’, based on objective setting, feedback and performance-
linked rewards (Roche, 1999). As a result, all national agreements since 1996 have
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made the payment of agreed salary increases for public employees dependent upon
co-operation with satisfactory implementation of the modernisation agenda set out in
the agreements (see, e.g. paragraph 27.18 of Towards 2016). Performance Verification
Groups (PVGs) for different sectors (health, local government, etc.) were established
to make recommendations as to whether or not pay increases should be made. In all
cases, it was envisaged that the process of reform and the successful implementation
of the change and innovation processes outlined in the national agreements would be
accompanied by ‘robust workplace partnership’ structures ‘characterised by high
levels of employee and union involvement with management’ (NCPP, 2005: 30).
Thus, we can see a clear interlinking of public policy agendas. The process of public
sector reform is outlined in strategic documents prepared in consultation with the
social partners and in the national partnership agreements themselves. A framework
for workplace partnership structures is also outlined in the national agreements.
These are to be established with a view to the implementation and management of
reform and change at workplace level in accordance with the principles underlying
social partnership; solidarity, inclusiveness, participation and workplace democracy.
Despite the promotion of workplace partnership, evidence suggests its penetration
appears relatively limited (Geary, 2006; O’Connell et al., 2004). Some authors have
suggested that a key problem is that of ‘buy-in’ by relevant stakeholders (Teague,
2004). Managers may fear that sharing information will undermine their authority,
while trade union representatives may struggle to move away from traditional con-
frontational behaviour. Others suggest that a key problem is that partnership initia-
tives are often ‘imposed’ on workers by management and unions and do not connect
with salient employee concerns (Tailby et al., 2004).
However, it might be expected that, as the workplace partnership process is framed
in a discourse of inclusion and participation, public sector staff would identify more
strongly and positively with partnership (where it exists) at workplace level rather than
the more distant, high-level arena of national level social partnership. This research
investigated the views of stakeholders (and in particular, ordinary employees) in a
typical public service workplace, a local authority, on both national and workplace
level partnership.
3 COMPLEXITY NOW: LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM
A local authority workplace (Urban City Council2) was chosen as a means of looking
in more depth at employee views of public sector partnership for a number of reasons.
First, employees there were all members of the biggest public service trade union—
IMPACT, which has been an enthusiastic supporter of, and has had a key role in, the
partnership process. Second, the council has the same workplace partnership struc-
tures that exist in other parts of the public sector (the universities, for example). Third,
the council was, and continues to be, subject to the public service modernisation
agenda and, indeed, the local government sector has been lauded as a ‘trail-blazer’ in
respect of elements of this agenda (e.g. independent monitoring and verification of
performance reporting).3 Furthermore, and crucially for the analysis here, local gov-
ernment has been identified as a sector ‘where there has been a strong emphasis on
2 Guarantees of anonymity were given, so all names used are pseudonyms.
3 See the Service Indicators in Local Authorities 2004 Report available at http://www.lgmsb.i.e./upload/
documents/ServiceIndicators2004.pdf.
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deepening social partnership for implementing change’ (OECD, 2008: 116). Lastly,
the council should present a relatively benign environment for partnership structures
to be established as, for reasons outlined below, we hypothesised that the employees
in question would be likely to be well-disposed to the concept of workplace
partnership. Before going on to describe the case study workplace in detail, it is
necessary to look more closely at reform in the local government sector in the light of
the general discussion of public sector reform above.
The Local Authority National Partnership Advisory Group (LANPAG) was set up
as the national partnership body that represents the local authority employers and
trade unions. It is made up of a number of nominees of the employer body, the Local
Government Management Services Board (LGMSB) and the trade unions. In 1999,
LANPAG agreed a framework document for partnership within local authorities.
Since then its role has been to co-ordinate, advise and support each local authority in
devising its partnership approach, and to promote a two-way flow of communication
on partnership findings and developments. LANPAG also administers funding for
the employment of workplace partnership facilitators, provision of training and
facilitation of meetings. Performance indicators for the local authority sector, set out
in the PPF and Sustaining Progress national agreements, were also agreed through
LANPAG. The establishment of Performance Verification Groups (PVGs) is handled
at national level by the LGMSB.
In Ireland, a key component of reform is the Performance Management Develop-
ment System (PMDS) for local authorities agreed by the social partners under the
Sustaining Progress agreement. Section 26 of Sustaining Progress4 sets out a mecha-
nism for verifying performance involving LANPAG, the Local Government Perfor-
mance Verification Group (LGPVG), the Secretary-General of the Department of
Environment, Heritage and Local Government, and the Local Authority National
Council.
This is a wondrously complicated process. Initially, an action plan is agreed by
LANPAG. The action plan is then approved by the LGPVG and issued to each local
authority by LANPAG. Each local authority head then provides a report on the
progress achieved in respect of the various commitments. This report includes any
‘observations’ made by the local partnership committee. When the individual local
authority reports are received by LANPAG, these reports and a sectoral report, are
submitted to the Secretary-General of the Department. Having considered these
reports, the Secretary-General will submit her/his own assessment of progress to the
LGPVG. The LGPVG will then carry out its verification process, which includes site
visits to individual local authorities, and a report with recommendations, is sent to the
Secretary-General for consideration. At this stage, if the Secretary-General is satisfied
with progress, she/he will approve payment of the increases due. If not, she/he may
unilaterally decide to refuse to sanction payments or may defer payments.
This process of reform and verification applies in substantially the same manner
across the entire public service (although, as noted, the local government sector is seen
as being in the vanguard of the change process). To investigate further the links
between the reform and partnership processes a typical local authority workplace was
chosen as a case study location.
4 See also section 33 of Towards 2016.
465National and Workplace Partnership
© 2010 The Author(s)
Industrial Relations Journal © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
4 INVESTIGATING LOCAL AUTHORITY PARTNERSHIP
Urban City Council employs approximately twelve hundred staff in various clerical/
administrative, professional and manual grades. Around five hundred staff members
are ‘outdoor’ and they work in various depots around the city. The focus here is on the
‘indoor’ staff, predominantly clerical and administrative workers, all of whom are
members of IMPACTandbased in theTransportation andEnvironment departments.
The membership of the indoor local government branch of IMPACT is white-
collar, and industrial action among indoor staff is historically rare. IMPACT is seen
as a union that frequently resorts to the state dispute resolution machinery (the
Labour Court, Rights Commissioners, etc.). This type of trade unionism may be
described as being the preserve of better-qualified and more professional employees
and is based more on upholding the growing array of individual workers’ legislative
rights, more geared to consultative processes and, arguably, less dependent upon
collective action in the traditional sense (Wallace et al., 2004). Thus, it might be
expected that such workers would be more amenable to partnership than those in
more ‘militant’ workplaces (or indeed, than their blue-collar, outdoor colleagues).
The research (consisting of semi-structured interviews, documentary analysis, and
a survey questionnaire) was carried out in 2004 during four day-long visits to the
council headquarters. Initial interviews took place with the deputy head of human
resources (HR), the local union representative and the local partnership facilitator.
Each was asked to suggest employees to be interviewed and each interviewee, in turn,
was asked to nominate another candidate (‘snowballing’). All employees were inter-
viewed at the workplace. In all, interviews with ten staff members (seven females and
three males) lasting approximately 45 minutes each were conducted, recorded and
transcribed. In addition, 100 survey questionnaires were randomly distributed in the
two departments and 32 responses were received.
The sample therefore is small and, as with any case study research, there are
distinctive circumstances that apply to this workplace so that questions about the lack
of generalisability do arise (Black et al., 1997). However, the detailed examination of
processes in an organisational context and knowledge about the processes underlying
the behaviour and its context can help to specify the conditions under which the
behaviour can be expected to occur. The basis of any generalisation, therefore, is not
primarily about the typicality of the organisation (notwithstanding the factors typical
of the sector—IMPACT’s presence, employee profile, archetypical partnership struc-
tures and an advanced reform agenda—outlined above), but the existence of particu-
lar processes, which may influence behaviours and actions in organisations (Hartley,
1994).
The partnership facilitator, based in the council since 2000, outlined at length the
setting up and operation of the partnership process there. The initial step (four years
prior to the research) was to set up a partnership committee with representatives of
unions and management, chaired by the facilitator. Training was brought in for the
committee, funded by LANPAG, and based around consensus and problem-solving
techniques. One of the initial aspects of the process was a series of partnership briefing
sessions (a ‘Workplace Review’), which all staff members were invited to attend.
Employees were broken into small groups, mixed with regard to department and
grade, and asked to raise issues with which they felt partnership should deal. These
were collated and a database formed. The partnership committee then began to
attempt to address the issues raised through the establishment of various sub-
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committees. As noted above, the committee also has a role in the implementation of
the reform agenda and verification processes.
5 PARTNERSHIP: THE VIEW FROM BELOW
Employee respondents were strongly of the view that general social and economic
conditions, and pay and conditions for workers in the Irish economy and in the
council itself had improved as a result of the national partnership agreements
(Table 1). One female employee pointed out that her primary rationale for union
membership was: ‘the pay agreements coming into force at the moment. We’re voting
yes, yes, yes!’. The interview data generally revealed strong support for the process,
especially in terms of pay outcomes: ‘I would absolutely be in favour of partnership.
How could you not be?’ (Cian).
Survey respondents were also asked to consider if trade unions had a greater role in
influencing state social and economic policy. Two-fifths of respondents (thirteen) felt
that this was the case while just one responded negatively.5
Broadly speaking, the results suggest a quite positive view of national partnership.
When the focus shifts to the level of the workplace, however, the picture is somewhat
different (Table 2). Respondents were asked for their views on whether greater co-
operation between employees and employers at the workplace was evident in the
partnership era. A large number was undecided on this question, while opinion was
5 It should be noted that more than half of respondents (eighteen) were undecided.
Table 1: As a result of social partnership, there are improved
Strongly
agree/
Agree Undecided
Disagree/
Strongly
disagree Total
Socio-economic conditions for
Irish workers
24 4 4 32
Pay/conditions for Irish workers 27 4 1 32
Pay/conditions at my workplace 24 5 3 32
n = 32.
Table 2: As a result of social partnership, there is
Strongly
agree/
Agree Undecided
Disagree/
Strongly
disagree Total
Greater employee/employer
co-operation at the council
9 14 9 32
Greater union influence on management
policy at the council
5 11 16 32
n = 32.
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evenly split among the remainder. More worrying, from a trade union perspective, is
the fact that employees clearly feel that unions have not gained more influence at
workplace level.
The interview data revealed that while respondents believed that workplace part-
nership in principle was a good idea, and that the Workplace Review had been a
worthwhile exercise, in practice the process had little positive impact on their working
lives:
There would be an awareness that there are partnership groups and that. We’ve gone to various
workshops about it, we’ve done questionnaires about how happy we are in the workplace and do we
need change and our colleagues and things like that . . . I can’t say there has been any difference though
(Deirdre).
Overall the interview and survey data indicate a greater approval of national
partnership. This was unequivocally the view of Brendan, the local union
representative:
(Partnership) at a macro-level where (IMPACT’s General Secretary) talks to (the Minister) and his
mandarins works very well. I can picture them all having a grand chat about pensions and all that stuff,
important stuff really and it works. But there is no real partnership once you get outside of the macro
deals.
As noted above, this is somewhat counter-intuitive given the discourse of work-
place partnership. Furthermore, this is so despite the fact that the evidence seemed to
show that workplace partnership has targeted issues of concern to the council’s
employees. The key issues exercising staff that emerged from the fieldwork were the
lack of organisational communication, problems of communication with manage-
ment, the lack of performance recognition and feedback, and issues around promo-
tion andmobility. The issues prioritised in the council’s 2003–05 Strategic Plan closely
mirrored these; the development of staff fora, the breakdown of barriers between
grades, improved staff-manager communications and a new system of staff
recognition/mobility. Moreover, the ‘buy-in’ issue alluded to above did not feature to
any great degree; according to the partnership facilitator, while initially some reser-
vations about the process surfaced on the management side in particular, four years
on from its inception the management nominees were drawn from the upper echelons
of the council. Furthermore, the local union representative’s objection to the process
centred, not on any feeling that his (and the local union’s) role was being ‘displaced’
(Geary and Roche, 2006), but that the partnership process was being invoked by
management only on a selective basis (see below).
6 REFORM AND RHETORIC—EXPLAINING
THE NATIONAL-LOCAL DIVIDE?
The small-scale data here reflects national evidence that suggests workplace partner-
ship in the public sector is struggling to establish itself and that there is a concern
about the lack of successful outcomes (Geary, 2006; O’Connell et al., 2004; Williams
et al., 2004). To explain this we need to take a closer look at distributive and structural
issues surrounding national and workplace partnership. In particular, we believe, a
persuasive explanator for the less emphatic support for workplace partnership among
employees could be its use as a vehicle of public sector reform, as evidenced by the rise
of managerialist ‘rituals of verification’ in the local government sector (Power, 1997).
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A key element of this relates to the verification process outlined above.We saw that,
while wage increases are negotiated centrally (and take careful note of prevailing
macro-economic trends to do with inflation, national competitiveness, etc.), their
delivery is dependent on events and progress at local level. This peculiar structure
entitles the Secretary-General of a government department, upon recommendation of
a technocratic verification body, to unilaterally suspend the implementation of agreed
wage increases under the national partnership agreement for a particular local unit,
where the unit’s progress report fails to meet the performance targets of the public
sector modernisation action plan. This action plan and progress report system effec-
tively turns the local partnership committee into amanagerialist body that enforces and
records local trade union concessions, such as the introduction of an individualised
PMDS,which are necessary to obtain thewage increases under the national agreement.
An extract from the Urban City Council Action Plan/Progress Report from the
time the fieldwork was carried out is reproduced in Appendix A. The ‘check list’
nature of the process may be key to understanding why workplace partnership is not
viewed in the same positive light as the national process. The process certainly differs
from traditional productivity and work organisation agreements that resulted from
collective bargaining.
According to the Urban City Council Annual Report the function of PMDS is to
design and agree a ‘role profile for each employee setting out the key result areas and
the objectives/standards required’. All employees are to receive a ‘staff profile’ con-
taining a ‘detailed schedule of staff responsibilities, outlining the specific role of staff
in each of their key duties’. These roles are to be reviewed with staff biannually.
Individualised feedback on a one-to-one basis for all employees is to be given annually
by management. The purpose of the appraisal process is to ‘monitor current perfor-
mance, improve future performance, maintain standards, assess potential, develop
individuals’ training needs and set agreed targets’. The report states that the impact of
the system to date has been that all staff members ‘are clear of their role and
responsibilities and what is expected from them’; it also states (without more) that
‘productivity has increased since the introduction of the appraisal system’.
6.1 Commitment and control
A clear majority of respondents in this research (involved in white-collar, semi-skilled
work) reported that their workloads were increasing.6 It was clear that respondents
felt demands put on them at work were escalating; that work was becoming more
qualitatively intense:
I suppose that’s one of the difficulties of the job. There seem to be more things coming onto our table
now that weren’t there twenty years ago (Francis).
Akey element of reformunder thepartnershipprocess has been increased interaction
with the public and improved service delivery through, inter alia, more flexible working
patterns (e.g. longer opening hours) and better ‘communication of performance to
customers’.7 Thompson (2003) argues that many jobs (particularly involving service
6 More than half of survey respondents reported, first, that their workload had increased in the last two
years and, secondly, that staffing levels in the council were insufficient.
7 Extracted from the Urban City Council Agreed Action Plan/Progress Report. See also Appendix A and
section 28 of Towards 2016.
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provision) have been expanded to include a greater range of tasks, what he refers to as
multi-skilling or multi-tasking. Jobs that involve dealing with the public often require
greater levels of ‘emotion work’ (Noon and Blyton, 2002) and so, require more ‘bits’ of
the individual employee to be put into the work. Du Gay (2008) argues it is difficult to
underestimate the importance allocated to qualities of ‘enthusiasm’, ‘enterprise’ and
‘compassion’ in recent discourses of public sector organisational reform. This ties in
with the idea that the search for ‘quality’ service provision is likely to require high levels
of employee commitment. This may result in greater autonomy for, and an upskilling
of, workers. The need for employers to generate commitment to the organisation, on
this view, should imply a ‘much firmer basis than in the past for amutuality of interests
between labour and management’ (Kelly, 1998: 144), less conflict and, therefore,
greater scope for consensual employment relations. This will arguably be reinforced
where employees feel they have a voice regarding key issues in their working and
organisational life (changes in work practices, organisational strategy, etc.). This, of
course, is the discourse that surrounds workplace partnership.
Respondents here, however, gave extremely negative responses to survey questions
around information provision and responsiveness to employee needs by the employer;
a clear majority of council employees felt that the organisation was not communicat-
ing with, nor responding to, its staff effectively (Table 3). This finding is strongly
reflected by recent national survey data. O’Connell et al. point out that surprisingly
high percentages of public sector employees seemed to feel that they were ‘hardly ever’
provided with information in key areas such as product/service innovation, introduc-
tion of new technology, re-organisation of services, or changes to work practices
(2004: 16).
It is clear that all employers need to garner some minimum level of commitment
from their employees to the organisation or, at least, to the task in hand. Much of the
literature on contemporary service sector employment emphasises the need for
organisations to ‘differentiate’ themselves on the basis of ‘quality service’ and ‘cus-
tomer care’ (Bosch and Lehndorff, 2005). Even for the most protected sectors of
public service employment ‘consumerist’ principles and expectations are increasingly
relevant to how services are provided (Crouch, 1999). Thus, arguably, the need to
generate employee commitment grows ever more acute in such sectors. At the same
time, the nature of the business influences how this is achieved. It might be likely that
commitment can be generated through individualised pay structures or by granting
employees greater ‘responsible autonomy’ in their work (Noon and Blyton, 2002).
However, there is a less benign view of the manner in which employees become more
‘embedded’ in the organisation. This view highlights that where neo-Taylorist models
Table 3: Information provision and employer responsiveness
Strongly
agree/
Agree Undecided
Disagree/
Strongly
disagree Total
My employer is responsive to my needs 10 8 14 32
I am kept well informed by my
employer about developments at work
8 5 19 32
n = 32.
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of work organisation have been introduced, flatter organisational structures and
relative employee autonomy exist side-by side with increased delegation of responsi-
bility to employees to meet market-determined economic objectives of the employer;
this leads to the emergence of ‘(organisation) dependent independent employees’
(Dølvik and Waddington, 2005: 323). Here, employee compliance and direct man-
agement control are more likely to feature.
This latter view seems to approximate the ‘metrics’ approach adopted in the local
authority sector. New Public Management research has suggested that performance
indicators tend to have an inability to explain why and how certain things happened;
they can also result in an excessive focus on what gets measured (and, frequently, this
tends to be extremely short-term action). As it is extremely difficult to design a
performance measurement model, which adequately captures all aspects of multi-
faceted work of the types increasingly being done by local authority employees, the
introduction of quantitative performance metrics is likely, not to induce greater effort
on the part of employees, but rather ‘influence their distribution of effort, and of time
and attention, among their different responsibilities’ (Goldthorpe, 2000: 218). The
introduction of controlling benchmarking techniques then, represents a fundamental
shift from the ‘management by commitment’ suggested by the discourse of workplace
partnership to the neo-Taylorist ‘management by control’ approach traditionally
used in relation to unskilled employees, like assembly-line workers. Apparently, in
return for the pay increases negotiated at national level, local government employees
at the workplace are required to work through a (Fordist-like?) list of conditions to be
fulfilled in terms of performance measurement. This suggests the possibility that what
is happening on the ground in local authorities is more micro-management despite a
more multi-faceted workload, and more quantitative targets to be reached despite the
qualitative language of ‘service’, ‘quality’, and ‘inclusion’. Thus, we see the expected
relationship between more multi-faceted work and management style inverted; the
greater the range of tasks and skills required of local government employees (includ-
ing more ‘emotion’ work) the more ‘management by control’. This interpretation of
events at Urban City Council finds support in the OECD review of the Irish public
sector generally:
The Performance Verification Process is, for example, a monitoring mechanism of co-operation, in an
industrial relations context, with modernisation processes under the pay agreements, rather than a
forum for a holistic review of organisational performance (2008: 29, emphasis added).
This is likely to have important implications for the ‘public sector ethos’, which
may be undermined by such a metrics-based approach (Wickham, 2006). Recent
national data found that while four-fifths of respondents professed themselves ‘proud
to work for (their) organisation’, it was public sector workers who were more likely to
respond positively (O’Connell et al., 2004: 30). Although council workers may not be
felt to embody such an ethos to the extent of, say, nurses or teachers, there was
evidence from the respondents that work in local government was seen as having a
positive association with public service. One interview respondent, for example,
referred to the satisfaction of being able to contribute to solving issues of local public
concern:
I always had a great interest in traffic safety generally. (In 1994) I became the county road safety officer
here. I really, really enjoy what I’m doing . . . I think (that is) worth an awful lot of extra money if you
can out a monetary value on it (Francis).
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AsWickham (2006) points out, public sector organisations are part of the common
public sphere and exist to service citizens, not customers. Thus, NPM ‘accounting
techniques’ by:
measuring all elements of performance in order to identify the specific public service elements (so that
the state can then explicitly pay for them) undermines the general public service ethos of the enterprise
(ibid.: 166).
Similarly, Pate et al. (2007) find the most persuasive explanation of the decline of
trust in public sector management that they document to be the erosion of the public
sector ethos and ‘the denigration of public sector ideology and values’ (ibid.: 466)
represented by senior management commitment to a resource-based view of public
sector organisations.
6.2 National gain for local pain?
How does this relate to the positive attitudes displayed towards national partnership?
Too often in the literature, partnership at national and local level is viewed separately.
There is, in relation to public sector partnership, however, a need to explicitly inte-
grate views of both as part of the same system. In this research, virtually all respon-
dents (employees, union representatives and employers) agreed on the success of the
partnership process in terms of pay outcomes. Representation in pay negotiations,
obviously, remains one of the key determinants of trade union membership. National
partnership therefore gives the union movement a very visible and easily identifiable
return; periodic wage increases. Conversely, the absence of any local bargaining
renders the impact of the local union less discernable.8
National social partnership may also be seen to be more acceptable or appealing to
stakeholders (including employees) because it at least aspires to fulfil ideas of delib-
erative democracy. Labour is explicitly and, crucially, publicly, given a ‘voice’, and is
viewed as having political and policy-making ‘clout’. This can be seen in the manner
in which the contents of the national agreements have been progressively expanded,
from an early focus simply on the questions of pay and tax reform, to the plethora of
issues that later featured (migration, waste management, alcohol/drug misuse, etc.).
Under the various partnership agreements, a host of bodies, working groups, and task
forces, on which the unions were represented, were set up (23 under the PPF alone;
Turner, 2002) and through the involvement in the process of community and volun-
tary groups, union representatives have come into contact with a range of other civil
society actors. The sense of partnership giving the unions a policy platform beyond
the narrow confines of workplace bargaining was alluded to by Brendan (IMPACT
workplace representative):
Being promised long-termmacroeconomic taxation policy stuff was a new dimension, and in ’87 and the
early ’90s you had to say, ‘we’re going to have to wait for these tax cuts’, and you did have to wait but
you did get them. People on both sides did honour their word.
At workplace level, however, the picture is quite different. Here, respondents did
not endorse the view that partnership resulted in more ‘voice’ (particularly in terms of
union voice) and, as explained above, micro-management and quantitative target-
setting were increasing. As can be seen from the extract of the Action Plan/Progress
8 This is less of a factor in the public, as opposed to private, sector given the centralised nature of pay
determination. Nevertheless, local ‘top up’ bargaining did occur in the pre-partnership era.
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Report in Appendix A, many of the key commitments agreed in exchange for pay
increases remain to be decided at national level (atypical working arrangements, for
example) with merely their implementation left to local actors. The extent to which
local implementation occurs through partnership is, it seems, variable. Thus, the pay
increases negotiated nationally come with attached conditionalities to be worked
through at local level, many of which, it seems, are implemented by management
‘decree’. One example given by Brendan colourfully bears this out:
The manager, for example, decided he wanted a paper-free, automated environment and he just decreed
that, you know . . . if anybody had any reservations or objections or suggestions, well, tough. It was
coming in and that was it.
This interpretation seemed to be confirmed by Alice (HR representative): ‘What
has happened with partnership is that management have decided on things that they
might want to send to the partnership committee’ (emphasis added).
This, again, reflects national trends. The ESRI/NCPP study examined both the type
of information available in the workplace and the extent to which workers’ views are
considered and acted upon. Approximately a quarter of respondents reported that
they were ‘rarely’ or ‘almost never’ consulted prior to major decisions, provided with
feedback on why decisions had been made or, even where prior consultation had
taken place, had any attention paid to their views (O’Connell et al., 2004: 95). In
Urban City Council, respondents were strongly of the view that workplace partner-
ship initiatives (especially theWorkplace Review) had not resulted in their views being
taken into account:
We were all asked our views on a whole load of different things, but nothing happened. Maybe that’s
the problem; nothing ever happens from anything. It’s great to talk, it’s great to get everybody’s views,
but if nothing changes then what’s the point? (Mandy).
In relation to one key issue of public sector reform, the introduction of PMDS,
local partnership did have a role to play in the council. Given that this was identified
by management, unions and staff at the time of the research as the main HR issue
coming down the line one might have expected partnership to be actively involved in
the information and consultation process around the introduction of the system.
Instead, according to the partnership facilitator:
partnership will be involved in promoting (PMDS) and explaining what’s within it. I think the greatest
fear of it by staff would be they see it as a stick coming to beat them. We need to sell it as a means of
them identifying areas that would allow them to improve themselves within their work location, and to
improve the public service generally beyond that (emphasis added).
Thus, the role of local partnership would be to ‘sell’ the (seemingly unquestioned)
merits of PMDS to staff, rather than actively involving the latter in ‘common own-
ership of the resolution of challenges’ (Partnership 2000), or indeed ‘the customisation
of national policies for local level implementation’ (LANPAG Strategic Plan 2003–
05). The discourse of inclusion, participation and deliberative democracy, it seems,
arrives at the level of workplace partnership in a highly qualified fashion. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, given this, the attempts made to ‘sell’ the system had not been suc-
cessful, and there remained significant fear and mistrust amongst staff members:
In HR a lot of the policies and procedures are always bent. People implement them in their own way.
You will never have standard across the board and it’s the same with PMDS. If someone doesn’t like
their employee, it’s obviously going to work out not in the employee’s favour (Geraldine).
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Interestingly, the restricted role for the local partnership committee in relation to a
key reform mechanism like PMDS seems to be not untypical of the broader public
service. The NCPP review of Civil Service reform identified a number of cases where,
while partnership committees had initiated and implemented many policy decisions
concerning the work environment, they simply ‘undertook a monitoring role when
dealing with the PMDS issue’ (NCPP, 2003: 5).
A final problem is the thorny issue of the binding arbitration procedure regarding
pay compliance clauses introduced as part of Sustaining Progress (which contains
binding mechanisms to bring finality to pay disputes) and the fact that all of the
partnership agreements contain ‘no strike’ clauses (see appendix A). For staff and the
local union industrial action in respect of any of the conditionalities tied to pay
agreements (negotiated, remember, centrally) is not an option.
7 CONCLUSIONS
Over the last two decades, social partnership has become institutionalised as the
‘normal’ method of socio-economic governance in Ireland. As part of the process,
issues of public sector pay and modernisation have featured increasingly in the
national agreements. The sample in this research is small and we must be careful
about generalising. However the case study location was selected as a means of
investigating in-depth how the (archetypal) workplace partnership process operates in
the local authority sector. Particularly apposite for this research, given the nature of
the workforce (white-collar, professional employees who are members of a union
noted for its reluctance to engage in traditional collective action) and the nature of
public sector clerical/administrative work, is the fact that we would expect these
workers to be among the groups most likely to be well-disposed towards a non-
conflictual, partnership approach.
The findings here echo national data (Roche, 2007) in indicating that most respon-
dents in this public sector workplace were quite supportive of national level social
partnership. However, the data show that there has been a singular failure by the
union movement to effectively link the different levels of partnership. Respondents
did not see much evidence of a more ‘partnership oriented’ approach to employer-
employee relations, or greater employee participation, and did not see any significant
increase in union influence at their workplace.
The findings suggest that partnership at national level has been seen by most
respondents as relatively beneficial in terms of pay and the broad economic climate.
Clearly, too, the process (at least until the economic turbulence of 2009) has coincided
with a period of sustained economic growth. The (relative) satisfaction with, and
enhancement of, the trade union movement’s national standing, however, must be set
against the more negative perception of partnership at the workplace. It seems that in
the Irish partnership process the benefits (pay and some level of policy input) accrue
at national level, while the costs (conditionalities, binding arbitration, etc.) are felt at
local level. In this article, we have, thus, sought to emphasise the (slightly ambiguous)
national gains and the (rather more entrenched) local pains of Irish social partnership
in the public sector. Here, partnership is an odd case, as it is not truly voluntarist but
nor does it operate on a statutory basis. The voluntary national agreements actually
set up a ‘quasi-statutory’ mechanism in the public sector which is tightly linked to the
modernisation agenda. The result is that, in terms of modernisation and change, the
local union (via workplace partnership structures) simply ‘negotiates’ for the least bad
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result. Local representatives are required, for example, to bring forward proposals
merely as to type of PMDS to be implemented.
The example of this local authority suggests that partnership has resulted in a
trade-off of pay increases for, arguably, less employee and union voice at the work-
place, with local partnership committees reduced to the role of ‘selling’ a pre-
determined reform agenda. The process has been used in a managerialist manner to
steer through a public sector reform schedule, which seeks tighter, more controlling
management structures, and which risks undermining the core public service ethos.
This suggests a version of ‘deliberative democracy’ that is largely instrumental; the use
of partnership as a legitimisation tool.9 The union movement, it seems, has singularly
failed to adequately link structures of national and workplace partnership. The same
cannot be said of the state and employers, who viewed partnership as a vehicle for
market-based public sector reform. However, in early 2009, employers, both public
and private, decided to freeze all pay rises due under the national social partnership
agreement (Sheehan, 2009). This move not only sheds a new light on Teague and
Donaghey’s (2009) account of Irish partnership as an ‘unorthodox system of institu-
tional complementarities’, but also questions its future practical use for state officials
as a tool to manufacture consent for market-based public sector reform.
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